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[A] Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the disruptive potential of memory in peacebuilding 
processes where and when they materialise in the built environment. There is a 
diverse literature on how museums, memorials and sculpture are used to signify, 
electively narrate or even erase history and condensed forms of heritage (Schramm, 
2011). However, there is comparatively less work on how such artifacture confront 
mainstream policy communities concerned with place making in uncertain and 
vulnerable post-conflict conditions. This analysis aims to evaluate the confrontation 
between public policy (in planning, urban management and development) with places 
that are loaded with meaning and memory for ethnic groups determined to legitimate 
their past as well as their future claims. It sets the context by conceptualisation the 
technical routines of planning and its concern with mediating interests, communicative 
action and collaborative practice; with the need to understand how space is socially 
constructed and in particular how memorialisation elevates place from the mundane 
to the sacred.  
 
The chapter argues that communicative practices have potential but reduced to 
techno-rational processes, struggle to accommodate the complex and contradictory 
subjectivities involved in remaking the past in the service of the present and the future. 
Empirically, the chapter focuses on the Maze Long Kesh (MLK) prison in Northern 
Ireland, which was gifted to the newly established Assembly after the 1998 Peace 
Agreement brought an end to nearly three decades of violence. MLK was built to hold 
both Loyalist (the UVF and the UDA) and Republican (the IRA and the INLA) 
paramilitaries and was where 10 IRA and INLA hunger strikers died in 1981 in a protest 
over their status as political rather than criminal prisoners.  
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The Northern Ireland conflict centred on competing identities between a 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist bloc who broadly want to maintain the union with Great 
Britain and a Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community who mainly aspire to the 
reunification of Ireland. The 1998 Peace Agreement established new political 
institutions, equality legislation and mechanism to release paramilitary processes 
committed of political offences. The new Northern Ireland Assembly is led by an 
Executive, which involves the main political parties in a statutory coalition but is now 
dominated by Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, which was politically 
linked to the IRA. The Executive is chaired by a First Minister from the DUP and a 
Deputy First Minister from Sinn Fein. The development of the prison was taken forward 
by the Strategic Investment Board (SIB), established to oversee post-conflict 
reconstruction and to use such assets to attract inward investment, rebalance the 
economy (toward the private sector) and manage the delivery of a number of former 
military sites handed over to the local administration. The plan for MLK proposed a 
mixed use development but controversially retained parts of the prison as an 
interpretative centre along with a new building dedicated to peace to be funded by the 
EU PEACE III Programme. For Republicans, it is a ‘sacred site of martyrdom’ (Graham 
and McDowell, 2007, p. 361) but for Unionists it is a ‘Shrine to Terrorism’ (The 
Newsletter, 20 July, 2012, p.1) and ultimately, these ethnic discourses could not be 
overcome by the power of capital, attempts at collaborative planning or a multitude of 
governance arrangements designed to bring the protagonists together. 
 
The official response to the planning and development of MLK drew heavily on 
Collaborative Planning methods, especially a concern for broad ranging consultations 
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with stakeholders, partnership approaches to key themes on prisoners, security 
interests and education groups and an emphasis on exchanging ideas and 
experiences (Healey, 2010). The methodology underpinning the case studies aligns 
with these concepts by mapping and interviewing the key interests, evaluating the 
performance of governance arenas and assessing the quality of discursive 
argumentation and how it enabled the project to progress.  Ultimately, this all largely 
failed to resolve the contested nature of the site but it does not mean that discursive 
practices, governance and mediation are meaningless in such environments. Rather, 
the chapter highlights the need to reform such discourse around realist agonistic, as 
opposite to antagonistic social relations, worked through governance regimes that 
have authority and some form of accountability. The MLK case demonstrates how 
memorialisation competes with modernisation in places coming out of conflict in 
increasingly unstable and disruptive ways. The chapter concludes by highlighting the 
normative value of agonistic strategies and in particular the importance of verifiable 
knowledge in creating and maintaining more authentic discursive practices.  
 
[A] Memorialisation and reconstruction 
Peacebuilding strategies and the struggle to maintain uncertain post-conflict stability 
have become increasingly concerned with the normalisation of markets, 
reconstructing infrastructure and de-risking regions for inward investment and growth 
(Richmond, 2011). These liberal forms of peace fuse political agreement with 
opportunities for accumulation as donor strategies aim to ‘transact’ investment funds 
as a reward for restoring specifically capitalist behaviours and methods of working 
(Richmond and Mitchell, 2012). Economic and physical planning are critical in such 
reconstruction processes and rational ideologies inform local policy making to ensure 
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that the necessary infrastructure is put in place to enable competition and growth 
(Richmond, 2011). There is no doubt that the immediacy of peacebuilding requires 
such discipline and organisational technologies are critical to the effective and efficient 
provision of services, goods and facilities that people genuinely need. The problem is 
that such technocratic regimes reify place in a way that can be redesigned through a 
set of rational procedures, rules and regulatory devices. A dominant and domineering 
economic discourse emerges bolstered by professional planning systems and legal 
frameworks centred on private property rights, development codes and 
comprehensive zoning. But, as Yiftachel and Gahem (2004) argue, such certainties 
are at best limited and at worst harmful where space cannot be simply planned and 
designed in abstract and reductive ways. This is especially the case where conflict is 
territorialised and space becomes both a material and non-material resource to be 
claimed, fought over, won and lost (Till, 2012). Even when hostilities have ended and 
some form of accommodative politics emerges, space remains a potent reminder of 
what conflict was for and how central it remains to enabling or disabling post-conflict 
transition (Neill, 2006). 
 
In this respect, heritage becomes a political resource to bolster identity and a 
connection to a cause, especially where it can be concretised in material artefacts, 
museums and sites in what Till (2012, p.3) calls ‘wounded cities’.  Place is thus 
inextricably linked to memory, memorialising and identity; it is the ‘most serviceable 
reminder of what has happened in our past, what is happening right now and what 
may come in the future’ (Lowenthal, 1979, p.110).  Sites and artefacts thus help to 
reconstitute an ‘imagined community’ that bind people and place in the service of 
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contemporary politics, ideological hegemonies and in the marginalisation of a 
disagreeable ‘other’ (Anderson, 1983).   
 
As such, places are open to an infinite number of interpretations, becoming ‘a 
palimpsest of overlapping multi-vocal landscapes’ that can readily slide into contested 
and contradictory narratives about history, specific events, victimhood and victory 
(Saunders, 2001, p.37). Monuments may no longer represent the ‘right memory’ but 
can become a collective social symbol with the ability to encapsulate and perpetuate 
ethno-national identities and claims (Schramm, 2011).  The temporal aspects of 
heritage sites are thus critical as time enables a shared experience to be mobilised in 
which people are connected to events both physically and emotionally. Post-memory 
is as critical, by handing down through the generations, a version of events that 
reproduces identity and anchors memory in the site of the most intense experiences 
(Greenspan, 2005). However, Graham and Howard (2008) argue that such site-fixated 
heritage risks fetishising place and obscures a wider social memory capable of 
accommodating different recollections and interpretations, a broader time-scape and 
the importance of intangible social markers and events.  MLK has little intrinsic or 
aesthetic heritage value as a fairly unspectacular 1970s brick built prison but as 
Graham and Howard argued, the tangible can only be interpreted through the 
intangible. ‘Material heritage sites may comprise no more than empty shells of dubious 
authenticity but derive their importance from the ideas and values that are projected 
through them’ (Graham and Howard, 2008, p.3).  
 
These ideas and values can be dissonant and reject official historical narratives to 
present an alternative reading of place and memory. The problem with ‘dissonance 
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arises because of the zero-sum characteristics of heritages, all of which belong to 
someone and logically, therefore, not to someone else. The creation of any heritage 
actively or potentially disinherits or excludes those who do not subscribe to, or are 
embraced within, the terms of meaning attending that heritage’ (Graham and Howard, 
2008, p.3). This also risks a particularistic approach that limits the potency of a site as 
political heritage, especially outside dissolute interests and values. As Dwyer (2000, 
p.667) argued in his consideration of the American Civil Rights movement, the 
challenge is to ‘jump scales’ in order to make connections with other struggles and 
sites of oppression to externally validate memorial processes and the sanctity of a 
particular place or event. Such legitimation tactics are thus critical in addressing 
selective and even sectarian modes of remembering that are often associated with 
dissonant artefacts, museums and memorials. 
 
The intensification of such memory making is best achieved by elevating places to the 
sacred and whilst pilgrimage trails and religious sites have emerged as a distinct 
heritage sector, the enshrinement of place is also tactically vital in asserting dominant 
ethno-national identities (Schramm, 2011). Sturken (2004) argued that such sites 
develop a quasi-religious, mystic status, becoming frozen, saturated with meaning and 
unable to exist in an everyday sense. The sacred is also manufactured as ‘a cultural 
technique for creating sanctity ... as a specific form of dealing with historical events’ 
(Eschebach, 2011, p.134). MLK is being socially and materially produced and the 
interaction between memorialisation and sacralisation versus the technical specifics 
of redevelopment and planning reveal the disruptive capacity of place in post-conflict 
conditions. Planning theorists argue that such disruption needs to be anticipated, 
identified and built into decision making processes. Difference is a socio-spatial reality 
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and methods and processes that transform dissonance into productive forms of 
democracy are at the heart of collaborative planning (Innes and Booher, 2010). 
 
[A] Collaborative Planning 
Allmendinger (2009) pointed out that the development of Collaborative Planning in the 
1980s in the UK was a response to frustration with technical rationality and the 
onslaught on the profession during the Thatcherite period.  He also shows that it has 
moved planning beyond a preoccupation with land uses to become more concerned 
with the quality of discourse, governance and stakeholder relations in shaping spatial 
outcomes. Communicative theorists argue that different modes of reasoning and 
systems of meaning have equivalent status in debate and the task for planners is to 
create a collective approach based on interaction and dialogue (Healey, 1997).  Here, 
language is vital and in planning, the priority is to establish a process of interactive 
collective reasoning or discourse which, in turn, involves a degree of collaboration, 
trust and reciprocity: 
In the end, what we take to be true and right will lie in the power of the better 
argument articulated in specific socio-cultural contexts (Healey, 1997, p.54).  
 
These contexts value everyday experiences and an institutional approach, which 
recognises that human actions and discourses are played out within the context of 
broader economic, labour market and political structures.  It suggests that individuals 
are not passive receptors of these systems but are reflexive agents with the choices 
and capacity to modify and even transform the structuring forces that influence their 
lives (Innes and Booher, 2010). Moreover, such practice can work across even the 
most divided contests and conflicts by acknowledging diversity, interdependence and 
dialogue within and between protagonists:   
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Interdependence among the participants is the source of energy as it brings 
agents together and holds them in this system.  Authentic dialogue is the 
genetic code, providing structure within which agents can process their diversity 
and interdependence … Diversity is the hallmark of the informational age.  The 
wide range of life experiences, interests, values, knowledge and resources in 
society is a challenge for planning and the efforts to produce agreements and 
collective action (Booher and Innes, 2002, p.227). 
 
Critics point out that Collaborative Planning is theoretically limited because it focuses 
on a critical commentary about planning rather than a societal critique of planning 
(Gunder, 2010).  The emphasis should not concentrate on the conduct of planners 
and their practices but rather on the broader power structures and ‘legitimisation 
dynamics within which public agencies often act’ (Yiftachel, 2001, p.253).  In short, 
because it does not question the authority embedded in power relations, it lacks the 
capacity for transformative change, especially for those at the fringes of decision 
making. Allmendinger (2009) also pointed out that interests have different access to 
information and can mobilise and interpret knowledge in vastly differing ways: between 
martyrdom and terrorism; sacralisation and profanity; and history and a contrived 
version of heritage. 
 
Knowledge and how it is used, corrupted and controlled is thus critical to authentic 
discourse, how claims are made and falsified and how public officials understand their 
professional roles in managing conflict (Murtagh and Ellis, 2011). The task is to 
acknowledge and domesticate ‘antagonism’ (irreconcilable conflicts and interests) into 
‘agonism’, recognising the inevitable competition in land uses that will ultimately 
impact upon the quality of life for the ‘other’ (Hiller, 2002).  Creating a competitive 
space in which interests bargain for recognition, precedence and acclaim does not 
mean that difficulties will disappear but will provoke crucial new ways of thinking about 
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the nature of ‘strife’ in power relations. Strife is ‘the expressive form of agonism’ and 
places an emphasis on discourse and how meanings and interpretations can affect 
planning systems (Pløger, 2004, p.75).  Pløger advocates participatory processes that 
stress openness, temporality, respect for difference and the need to live with 
inconsistencies and contingency as a way to progress.  Ways of achieving this in 
practice include open-ended processes, politically autonomous yet responsible 
institutional design, a plurality of discourses and an ongoing mutual and critical 
dialogue between politicians, planners and citizens (Pløger, 2004, p.87).  To deliver 
this, Flyvbjerg (2004, p.295) argues that planning processes and methods should 
‘focus on values, get close to reality, emphasise little things’, as well as studying cases 
and their contexts including their socio-political meaning and how place is variously 
used as an economic, cultural and territorial resource.  
 
Healey proposed a methodology for implementing and evaluating such an agenda in 
specific policy making and planning environments. Her Institutional Audit unpacks the 
circumstances, settings and routines, which might constitute agonistic, strife driven 
relations into progressive local politics, bargaining and agreement. Here, we need to 
work through a set of interconnected questions:   
• Who has a stake in the qualities of the urban regions; how far are these 
Stakeholders actively represented in current governance arrangements? 
• In what arenas does discussion currently take place? Who gets access to 
these? Do they interrelate issues from the point of view of everyday life and 
the business world? Or do they compartmentalise them for the convenience 
of policy suppliers? 
• Through what routines and in what styles does discussion take place? Do 
they make room for diverse ways of knowing and ways of valuing 
representation among stakeholders or do dominant styles dominate? 
• Through what policy discourses are problems identified, claims for policy 
attention prioritised, and information and new ideas filtered? Do these 
recognise the diversity among stakeholders? 
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• How is agreement reached, how are such agreements expressed in terms 
of commitments and how is agreement monitored?  Is it easy for those who 
are critical to implementation of the agreement to escape from the 
commitments? (Healey, 1996, pp.213-4; and Healey, 2010). 
 
This can be used in an evaluative or normative sense and seeks to offer a diagnostic 
tool both to understand and to rehabilitate conflict in land use processes. By looking 
at each component we can understand where things go wrong as well as when and 
how they work. It is not a template but a heuristic that is used here to evaluate the 
attempts to develop and deliver a comprehensive and agreed plan for the Maze Long 
Kesh. 
 
[A] The Maze Long Kesh 
Widely considered as one of the most significant material representations of Northern 
Ireland’s troubled history (Neill, 2006), the Maze Long Kesh (MLK) prison is located 
ten miles south-west of Belfast and housed approximately 25,000 prisoners and 
15,000 prison staff over the period of the conflict (Coiste, 2003). The 360-acre site was 
used until the 1960s as a Royal Air Force base and between 1971-72 for the mass 
internment without trial of mainly Nationalists as a hastily conceived and 
counterproductive response to the outbreak of violence in the late 1960s (Flynn, 2011).  
Internees were held in a series of old RAF compounds but as the conflict escalated, 
these were no longer suited to modern security needs. In 1976 a new prison complex 
was built based on a set of eight self-contained H-shaped blocks, which themselves 
became a symbol of British oppression and colonialist punishment among Nationalists 
and Republicans (see Figure 1). MLK prisoners were treated effectively as Prisoners 
of War, receiving special privileges on visits, freedom of association and the right to 
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refuse prison uniforms. In 1976 however, this Special Category Status was rescinded, 
leading to a series of protests both inside and outside the prison. The refusal to wear 
prison uniforms and dress only in blankets ultimately led to the decision by 
Republicans to commence a Hunger Strike, a tactic used throughout Irish history to 
mobilise popular and especially international opposition to British rule.  
 
Figure 1 Maze Long Kesh photographed shortly after its closure (SOURCE) 
 
[B] Methodology 
Methodologically the case study draws on: participant observation at four meetings of 
the Reference Groups set up to oversee the project; documentary analysis of political 
party statements, media coverage and written policies and programmes; and 18 semi-
structured in-depth interviews with the key actors in the development process. These 
included: managerial board members (see the PDU below, n=4 interviews); planning 
and policy community (3); museum and heritage experts (4); users present on the 
wider site (2); political and prisoner interests (4); and the local community group (1). 
The Institutional Audit provides the framework to help conduct the observations, 
interrogate policy documents and design the interview schedule but also makes 
explicit the positionality of the researchers and the way in which the data is collected 
and interrogated. Hermeneutic interpretations of socio-historic events, especially in 
Northern Ireland privilege the speaker but limit the capacity for challenge, dialectic 
entanglements and falsification. Researchers clearly need to gather the cultural 
knowledge to interpret and validate the experience of others and make explicit the 
frameworks that guide their methods and practice (Milner, 2007). By adopting the 
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Institutional Audit we make clear the variables and analytical categories that are critical 
to the formation, implementation and later collapse of the MLK project.  
 
[B] The context 
The Hunger Strike in 1981 was phased, with the first IRA member, Bobby Sands, 
dying on 5th May. He was followed by nine others, with each one associated with 
violent street protests in Republican areas, growing (critical) global interest and the 
politicisation of a resurgent Sinn Fein. A total of 100,000 people attended Sand’s 
funeral by which time he had been elected as an MP to the British House of Commons, 
further ramping up pressure on the Thatcher administration. The Hunger Strike was 
called off in October 1981 and whilst the specific demands of the prisoners (such as 
the right not to wear prison clothes) were eventually granted, there was still no 
restoration or official recognition of their Special Category Status.  
 
In 1994 the IRA declared its first ceasefire but it was not until Good Friday 1998 that 
a political Agreement was finally reached between the political parties including Sinn 
Fein. A central part of the Agreement also involved the early release, on license, of 
paramilitary prisoners and in 2000 the prison finally closed. Ownership of the site was 
subsequently transferred from the British government to the Northern Ireland 
administration through the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
(OFMDFM) in 2002. A number of former prisons, military bases and police stations 
were granted to OFMDFM as part of the Reinvestment and Reform Initiative (RRI). 
This was designed to modernise infrastructure, regenerate decommissioned sites and 
strengthen private (preferably international) investment led by the newly formed 
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Strategic Investment Board (SIB), which itself was modelled on the Kosovo Trust 
Agency (KTA) (Flynn, 2011).  Within this context, the overall management and control 
of the project was put in the hands of a new group called the Maze Long Kesh 
Programme Delivery Unit (PDU) and whilst it had no legal status, it was part of the SIB 
and answerable to Junior Minsters in OFMDFM. 
 
A Master Plan was developed proposing a sport stadium, events space for agricultural 
shows, an aviation museum based on the RAF heritage and crucially, an International 
Centre for Conflict Transformation. There was some uncertainty about what the Centre 
would contain, how it would remember the Hunger Strike, who would decide and how 
rival interests would be accommodated in telling their very different stories of prison 
life (Flynn, 2011). Flynn also showed that it became quickly embroiled in 
disagreements about the location of the sports stadium and its access to Belfast as 
well as its siting in an increasingly disputed and troubled project, not aided by the 
financial crises in 2008. 
 
The Master Plan was subsequently scaled back but £18m of EU PEACE III funding 
was secured for what was now termed a Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Centre 
(PbCRC). The shift in language to dedicate the Centre to peacebuilding aimed to 
reframe the site as a place of learning and global research rather than to remembering 
the specifics of the Republican struggle. A number of former prison buildings were 
retained, and officially ‘listed’ as protected structures including the prison hospital 
where the Hunger Strikers died, the main administration block, watch towers, a church 
and one of the eight H-Blocks. The remaining buildings were demolished leaving the 
site available for sale for development as part of the wider regeneration scheme. 
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This section uses Healey’s Institutional Audit to unpack the plan making process, the 
positions of the stakeholders, methods of engagement and the discursive strategies 
used to pursue respective interests and claims. Certainly, the PDU did attempt to 
deliver a wide and inclusive process by clearly mapping the range of stakeholders 
from local communities, prisoners and guards, political parties, professional archivists 
and potential users. Separate arenas were established to accommodate each set of 
interests, canvass positions, develop proposals and explore options. Whilst this 
enabled a broad debate about the site and its use it also surfaced deep sensitivities 
about the prison, its ‘wounded’ character and the multiple and contradictory routines 
about hurt, time and morality. This was most evident in a discursive tension between 
official narratives that stressed the economic value of the site and its regeneration 
potential and a sectarianised meta-narrative, which ultimately debilitated the process. 
Thus, agreement was not reached and the site (like the various atrocities, parades 
and flags) ‘fixed’ the past in a way that was not reducible to this version of collaborative 
working. But the analysis concludes by highlighting the value of the framework, not to 
reach consensus, but to point to some of the critical components that might offer a 
more engaged approach to the use of knowledge, authenticity and validation.  
 
 
[B] The stakeholders 
Figure 2 is important in this respect by mapping out the stakeholders in the use, 
management and development of MLK. It shows the importance of political interests 
and especially the distinction between Republicans and Unionist as summarised by a 
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representative from the academic sector: ‘For Sinn Fein this is Robben Island, a misty-
eyed look back on the heroic struggle ... but for Unionist it is a shrine to terrorism and 
the attitudes are visceral. There is no way a deal could be done’. The statutory 
interests cut across planning, environmental management and heritage and local 
residents groups were involved as were victims groups and prisoner families. 
Prisoners and various ex-prisoner support groups, museum and tourism experts as 
well as prison officers and security force representatives were also identified in the 
clusters. Finally, there are a set of business stakeholders with an interest in the wider 
development and the universities who had delivered programmes in the prison and 
who were also viewed by the PDU as potential tenants of the peacebuilding centre.  
 
Figure 2 Collaborative Stakeholder Map for the Maze Long Kesh 
 
[B] Arenas for discussion 
Six Reference Groups were established by the PDU and were organised around 
thematic interests including: Arts and Archives; Education and Learning; Civic Society; 
Public Services; Ex-prisoners; and Victims and Survivors. These Groups consisted of 
around 15-20 members and did structure a comparatively open dialogue around 
technical issues, sensitive subjects and how the development would accommodate 
the memories of people most affected by the prison and its legacy. 
 The Groups worked at one level … everyone was respectful and we got a 
chance to give our views. I heard things I hadn’t thought of and it made me think 
about my position on it (Ex-prisoner representative).  
 
However, such consultative structures were precisely that and as will be shown later 
they had little or no decision making powers, access to resources or control over the 
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delivery and monitoring of the wider Master Plan. It ‘… did move us to first base and 
consolidate the debate - we all knew what we were dealing with’ (Academic 
representative) and it allowed the risks to be understood in a way that enabled the 
development to move to the delivery stage. The Working Groups met regularly over a 
two year period to define the issues, consider plans, advise the PDU on the way 
forward and ultimately, to endorse the overall Master Plan. Their work was informed 
by a various technical studies that included: a number of business plans; financial 
analysis and investment appraisals; architectural surveys; design concepts; and a 
heritage review on how the retained buildings would present the prison’s history. 
Whilst there were issues about the scheme among loyalists and some right-wing 
Unionist politicians, there were no significant political objections and it was thus safe 
to move the project to the implementation phase. 
 
For that to happen, a new structure that was smaller, more business-led, politically 
appointed and implementation focused was needed. The Maze Long Kesh 
Development Commission (MLKDC) was established in October 2012 and very much 
modelled on the trusted semi-private Urban Development Corporations, which had led 
the regeneration of waterfronts across the US and the UK since the 1970s. 
Announcing plans for the new Vision and Development Plan (MLKDC, 2013) the 
Chairman stated that the scheme would generate £300m of investment and create 
5000 new jobs: 
Our vision, From Peace to Prosperity, is intended to demonstrate how 
economic development can help consolidate and build upon our peace. We will 
promote the PbCRC as a showcase to attract international developers and 
investors. From the interest already shown, I am confident that we will have in 
place £100m investment by 2016 (MLKDC, 2013, p.1). 
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From Peace to Prosperity emphasised the commercial opportunities on the site, its 
proximity to the main Belfast-Dublin motorway and the anchor tenants, including the 
aviation museum and the agricultural society were already committed to the project. 
Brochures, videos and commercial agents were employed to market the scheme that 
now carefully repositioned the PbCRC as an asset, able to connect to international 
researchers and resources. The use of the remaining H-Block or hospital and how 
they might be integrated with the Centre was not described or discussed in any detail 
in the Strategic Plan. 
 
[B] Routines 
The shift from the PDU to the Development Commission was reflected in changes in 
decision making styles and routines and the elevation of commercial and economic 
imperatives that would presumably override mundane sectarian concerns. Aesthetics 
also became an important feature of such reframing and rescaling. The MLKDC 
commissioned Daniel Libeskind, a world-renowned architect, best known for his 
design of the Ground Zero memorial in New York as the principal architect for the 
PbCRC. Libeskind is something of an expert in the architecture of trauma and had 
stamped his distinctive postmodern style on the Holocaust at the Jewish Museum in 
Berlin as well as preparing the plan for the reconstruction of the World Trade Centre. 
Ponzini and Nastasi (2011) highlight the value of starchitects in conferring legitimacy 
on sponsors, creating a spectacle above the ordinary and revalourising place, not for 
its functionality but for its symbolic value. However, Libeskind had to defend the 
scheme against accusations that it mimicked some of his earlier projects and that he 
failed to reflect local sensitivities and narratives:   
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I did not say that the design of the Centre should reflect any particular group’s 
story. I listened extensively to the multiple perspectives presented and what I 
said was, ‘all stories should be told’, which has been everyone’s goal from the 
start (quoted in the Belfast Telegraph, 10 May, 2013, p.1). 
 
The Education and Learning Working Group focused, in particular, on the PbCRC as 
a potential international university research facility that could link the experiences of 
Northern Ireland with other sites of conflict and transformation. The Centre aimed to 
draw in international scholars and researchers, further decoupling it from the raw 
intimacies of May 1981 but even here there were also concerns about how different 
stories would be narrated. First, the PDU and then the Development Commission 
insisted that the term ‘museum’ was inappropriate and stressed ‘peace’ as the meta-
narrative for the building. But, it was difficult to avoid the reality that the Centre and 
specifically the prison buildings where primarily artefacts through which the political 
history of the Northern Ireland conflict would inevitably be interpreted. The heritage 
and tourism consultants brought into advise on the complex suggested that a 
minimalist approach should be adopted to permit visitors to construct their own 
meaning and interpretation (and presumably avoid having to select what should be 
included and what should not be shown).  
 
[B] Discourses of memory 
At the outset the principal stakeholders did acknowledge the sensitivities of the site 
and how to articulate its significance as an icon of the Troubles but more importantly 
as an expression of a new time and a new politics. ‘The site, to me is a microcosm of 
the peace processes’, (Member PDU) and ‘it’s probably the biggest symbol of the 
Troubles’ (Archival representative). Attempts to articulate these very different stories, 
one hopefully compensating for the other in order to create the balance needed to 
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progress the scheme were not necessarily inconsistent. However, the semiotic 
significance of the H-Blocks and how they are depicted on the wall murals of Belfast, 
memorials (including in the US and France) as well as in non-tangible culture such as 
songs, poems and oral histories is hard to resist: ‘everyone’s image of the site, is an 
aerial view of the site as an H block ... that’s what everybody thinks of the site’ (Senior 
member, PDU).   
 
However, as much as it galvanised Republican politics it also otherised and even 
marginalised different readings of both the Troubles and the prison. A significant 
discourse is shaped around the language of pain, with MLK variously described as a 
place of ‘raw’, ‘fresh’, ‘hurt’.  Interviewees likened the events around the prison to a 
wound in social memory reinforcing its scared qualities with a PDU member explaining 
that ‘there's rawness about this site’, to a prisoner representative who stated that 
‘there’s an awful lot of hurt there’ referring especially to the families of prisoners.  There 
were a number of prison breakouts by Republicans including the escape of 38 
prisoners in 1983, when a Prison Officer died and six others were injured and a 
number of guards and security force members working at the prison had been killed 
by the IRA over its thirty-year history. Republicans did not oppose the inclusion of 
these deaths or the experiences of the state in the H-Blocks but the legacy of the 
prison in the lives of people who never actually went there demonstrates its potency, 
even in post-conflict Northern Ireland.   
 
A distinctive discourse thus emerged around ‘time’ and specifically a concern that the 
rehabilitation of the site was too hasty, as one Unionist politician explained ‘we are not 
ready for this yet’. When is a good time to tell the prison’s history, if at all or under what 
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conditions was unclear but officials also recognised that ‘the passage of time is no bad 
thing perhaps’ (Museums Representative) and ‘it takes time, to go through that whole 
process, but it’s a necessary time’ (OFMDFM representative). Resonating with 
Moshenska’s (2009) critique of the impacts of bombing and destruction upon memory, 
participants evoked wound’-like imagery, stating that ‘it is only closed a year, thirty 
years since the Hunger Strike, twenty years since people got out under the Good 
Friday Agreement, it’s still raw for people’ (PDU Member). Eschebach (2011) argued 
that living memory must expire in war sites before the question of how to tell their story 
can be dispassionately weighed as summed by a community sector stakeholder: ‘I 
think it’s maybe just too, too fresh just to keep something ... but time will tell’.   
 
[B] Follow through to implementation 
Ultimately, the quality and efficiency of collaborative planning processes are evaluated 
against what they produced as material consensual outcomes. Doyle and Wiedenman 
(2014) argued that the problem is that the start-up phase, with a wide identification of 
stakeholders, inclusive governance and multi-method consultation processes involve 
comparatively easy commitments for an authority to make.  Turning these initial 
debates into agreement required more manipulative and less collaborative tactics: 
‘you have to nurse it almost like an infant, and build up the trust ... it was more of a 
black art than a science’ (PDU Member). Moreover, the authority of the Reference 
Groups and their role in decision making was also questionable or at least unclear, 
‘They weren’t actually making the decisions and we've been very clear that you know 
we refer to them and take their views into account’ (Senior Member, PDU).  
Stakeholders were a ‘resource’ through which interpretations of the site were 
managed but for some participants they descended into a mere ‘talking shop’ 
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(Residents association representative).  As the process progressed their status as 
stakeholders rather than passive consultees with various levels of interest in the 
project gradually unravelled: ‘I think the level we were involved at wasn't at decision 
maker level, it was, “this is what we propose here”, are you alright with that?’ It wasn't 
involving, it wasn't a built up process’ (Future Site Occupier) and ‘… we don’t have the 
same effect on the people who are holding the purse strings’ (Site Occupier). The use 
consultative processes to incorporate disagreeable interests is not new but ultimately 
the failure to deliver an agreed outcome, in part, rested on the quality of the 
engagement and seriousness of the discussion in the planning process.  
 
Others were more cynical and saw the collaborative design purely in legitimation terms 
and that ‘there was a blueprint sitting in the cupboard that hadn’t been brought out yet 
... there’s always another agenda’ (Residents association representative). In short, 
there was a parallel process with the outward facing collaborative design presenting 
an ordered, objective, difficult but ultimately inclusive attempt to produce agreement 
running alongside a hidden, politicised deal making trade-off to secure the one thing 
that mattered; the Republican story of the Hunger Strike:     
 ‘I’m aware that it’s almost like a dual management, they're managing the 
interest groups, and then obviously they take the feedback ... I’m not too sure 
exactly what it’s achieving’ (Archival representative). 
 
Republicans said remarkably little publicly about the MLK, always downplaying the 
prison history and elevating peacebuilding centre and the value of the Northern Ireland 
process for states and societies coming out of conflict. The Loyalist Orange Order 
along with other Unionist politicians, including some from the DUP, formed a Raze the 
Maze campaign and gathered over 10,000 signatures on an online petition to 
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campaign for the demolition of the whole site. As the 2014 European and local 
government elections loomed, the DUP were under increasing pressure from 
Loyalists, other Unionist political parties and the Orange Order about their tacit 
endorsement of the project and formally withdrew their support in August 2013. This 
effectively ended the project and shortly after the EU also withdrew the £18m from the 
PEACE III Programme. The DUP leader published an open letter, which highlighted 
the fictitious nature of the opposition but maintained a veto over the development and 
especially the content of the retained buildings: 
‘Since this present deceitful Maze campaign began we have consistently and 
frequently stressed that we will not permit any shrine to be erected at the Maze 
and that no decision had been taken about the content and programme for any 
new Peace Centre or the use of the retained buildings, but that has not stopped 
our political opponents from inventing stories and seeking to frighten and raise 
concerns by agitating those who have suffered most from violent terrorism’ 
(quoted in the Belfast Telegraph, 15 August, 2013, p.1, Maze U-Turn: Peter 
Robinson’s Letter in Full to Senior Party Figures). 
 
By 2015 the agricultural society had moved on to the site and the aviation museum is 
in the process of being developed although hampered by a lack of funding. Sinn Fein 
and Republican ex-prisoners maintain that the PbCRC and the retained buildings will 
be developed and Libeskind recently claimed that it would be simply a matter of time 
as all such toxic projects go through disagreement and negotiation before they are 
finalised.   
 
[A] Conclusion 
A fresh set of inter-party talks were established in late 2014 to deal with the past, 
parades and the use of cultural symbols and the future of MLK is now part of these 
negotiations. Ultimately, its development will be sorted by the ethnic poker that 
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characterises these arrangements, not collaborative planning regimes and discursive 
practices. Such wicked problems are not necessarily reducible to communicative 
deliberation but the analysis does not render these approaches redundant, especially 
as a method in mediation and peacebuilding. The PDU and subsequently the MLKDC 
invested in collaborative concepts but these were limited. Initially, the authorities 
sought to foreground the economic at the expense of its political history and contested 
meanings. The modalities of (neo)liberal peace underpinned the project by appealing 
to investors, highlighting its strategic location and branding it as an icon of 
modernisation that had seamlessly displaced its violent past. There also was an 
attempt to decouple the project from the specifics of the site and re-present its 
meaning by jumping scales and appealing to its international, aesthetic and research 
significance.  
 
Graham and McDowell (2007) are wrong to dismiss the MLK as the product of a 
manipulative and selective Republican statecraft. These places and there are others, 
cannot be erased or devalued because they do not comply with the reimaging of 
Northern Ireland as a liberal, economically progressive and socially readjusted place. 
But nor is it helpful to see them endlessly reproduce a form of sectarian ethno-
nationalism and elements of the process have implications for the management of 
places and events with such disruptive potential in peace processes. Some 
stakeholders are more important than others but the process did not reveal or debate 
(in a discursive sense) what the explicit positions of ex-prisoners, families, prison 
officers, security forces and victims were on the actual development. Their claims 
about MLK needed to be more openly presented and the basis of such claims made 
transparent and open to verification and falsification. As the discourse descended into 
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predictable sectarianism, the claims about the prison and the peacebuilding centre 
became more hysterical, unfounded and visceral. The DUP First Minister admitted as 
much in the open letter that effectively collapsed the project. The centrality of 
knowledge, its validity and reliability and the capacity of others to unpack it would not 
necessarily have saved the development but it would have made clearer the nature of 
claims and counterclaims and how to treat evaluate their relative merits. The Working 
Groups were supported with largely technical and especially financial information but 
lay knowledge and the lived experiences of prisoners and victims does not mean that 
such evidence becomes inevitably inferior or sectarian.  
 
Handling such sensitivities requires a different range of skills and competencies 
among planners and project managers, especially when they work within state 
structures, cultures and laws. Professional routines may have leant to the collaborative 
but how to identify the conditions of strife and how various forms of power are 
constitutive of agonistic relations, requires a stronger engagement with the methods 
of peace building and conflict transformation. Such interdisciplinarity will not guarantee 
success either but it does highlight the need to rethink how a range of professionals, 
especially those involved in place-making are central to political stability. In particular, 
there is a need to see such processes, methodologies and skills move outside 
community relations, political mediation and the peace sector and into the mainstream 
cultures, practices and educational frameworks of the range of professionals charged 
with spatial development. 
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Figure 1 Maze Long Kesh photographed shortly after its closure (SOURCE) 
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Figure 2 Collaborative Stakeholder Map for the Maze Long Kesh 
